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1 In early October, 2016, Turkish production company Pana Film released a statement to
television and the Internet in attempt to curtail a broiling scandal over a web site they
had  recently  acquired.  Pana  had  purchased  the  rights  to  the  domain
kurtlarvadisidarbe.com, which translates to “valley of  the wolves coup,” in May,  two
months before a failed attempt by portions of the military to topple the ruling Justice and
Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi - AKP). While this might pique interest in
any circumstances, both fans and critics of the then thirteen-year-old Valley of the Wolves
([Kurtlar Vadisi], Show TV, 2003-20051) franchise were particularly intrigued because the
show has a reputation for uncovering conspiracies and revealing truths about politics and
power  in  Turkey  ahead  of  the  curve.  Many  fans  assume  the  producers  have  inside
knowledge about key events well in advance of the general public. 
2 Speculation  about  why  and  how  Pana  Film  had  known  to  purchase  the  web  site
compounded the already rife rumors regarding who had plotted the coup. It was not long
before TV talk show hosts Nihat Doğan and Ömür Varol began a campaign on their daily
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morning show Can’t Not Say It ([Söylemezsem Olmaz], Beyaz TV) to have Valley investigated
for potential involvement in the coup. The campaign was outrageous on many fronts: it
extrapolated from the web site  purchase and posited wildly  implausible  conspiracies
including secret  messages transmitted through years-old programs and mind control
based on the series’ soundtrack. It relied heavily on visual evidence that clearly negated
the claims being made and was, furthermore, based on false information. It also appeared
to be tied directly to corporate motivations, since the channel airing the accusations,
Beyaz TV, had just lost the contract to broadcast Valley reruns. Beyond this, when the
Pana Film team eventually did release a statement answering the accusations, Doğan and
Varol merely shifted the target of their inquiry, transforming Valley plot points into new
would-be conspiracies. As ridiculous as the claims were, they found audience in the fertile
paranoia of the State of Emergency (Olağanüstü Hal -  OHAL) in post-coup Turkey and,
within a week, a prosecutor took up the hosts’ invitation to open an investigation. 
3 This decision was not without irony, since Valley played a formative role in preparing the
way for such paranoia and, in a greater sense, in fomenting a nexus of nationalism and
post-truth politics that have been key to the AKP’s continued rule. This atmosphere relies
heavily on the logics of conspiracy theory and, in the argument that follows, I trace these
logics in Valley and among its publics by braiding three strands of evidence: the Valley 
text  itself,  media  discourse  about  Valley,  and  observations  from  interviews  and
encounters with Valley viewers that arose amidst ethnographic fieldwork2. I turn first to
the question of conspiracy theory as genre, and demonstrate how the genre norms that
Valley had standardized were  turned against  the  show by the  Can’t  Not  Say  It affair.
Though the exploration of genre gives us a chance to examine some of the key logics of
conspiracy theory, the function of such theory is also tied to its performative uses, and I
next turn to the Foucauldian notion of enunciation to explore this. Finally, I touch on
conspiracy theory as it circulates in the era of so-called post-truth politics, suggesting
that the trust in simple truth to combat such theory may be misguided. 
 
Conspiracy theory as genre in Valley
4 Valley premiered as a television serial on private channel Show TV in January of 2003. It
relates the story of Polat Alemdar, a Turkish secret agent who infiltrates the Turkish
mafia in order to destroy it in the first TV series, and then moves on to tackle other
enemies of the Turkish nation, be they local or international. Polat works with a small
team of  men (and,  later,  women),  sometimes  with the cooperation of  the  state,  and
sometimes against corrupt elements of its bureaucracy. Valley has thus far spanned three
TV series that garnered consistently high ratings on TV and online, and five feature films.
Over the fifteen years since it first aired, Valley has established a host of norms in its
patterns of communication with fans, a number of which were activated and reversed by
Doğan and Varol in their autumn attack on Valley. 
5 These norms are not unique to Valley but, rather, draw on and contribute to a larger body
of conspiracy theory that has been subject to a great deal of study. Among the branches of
this theorizing about conspiracy theory, I mark three broad trends: the typological, which
aims to distinguish the norms of the conspiracy theory argument; the interpretive, which
aims to consider the broader reasons for and meaning of conspiracy theory in the human
condition (e.g. Comaroff and Comaroff, Fenster, Jameson, West and Sanders3); and the
conspiracy-oriented, which focuses on the prevalence of actual conspiracy, and attempts
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to relate this to conspiracy theory (e.g. Marcus4). In what follows I focus primarily on the
typological, referring in particular to the work of Richard Hofstadter5, who discusses the
“paranoid  style”  of  conspiracy  theories,  Earl  Creps6,  who  examines  their  “rhetorical
genre”, and Jovan Byford7, who describes the “anatomy” of such theories. Though I here
make use of typologies, my interest in conspiracy theory is ultimately interpretive, and it
is for this reason that I adopt Creps’ term “genre” when speaking of the norms of the
conspiracy argument. 
6 I employ genre not as a formal category but, rather, in line with Briggs and Bauman8,
drawing on Hanks9,  as  “an orienting framework for  the production and reception of
discourse10.” Such a conception allows us to consider genre as a means for a multitude of
discursive operations, bridging the gap between texts and those who use them. Indeed,
Karin  Barber  calls  genre  “the  pivot  between the  producer  and receiver  of  a  text11.”
Though the argument to follow relies heavily on norms established within the Valley text
itself, my ultimate interest is in the circulation and use of conspiracy theory among the
publics who access and relate to Valley, and here I draw on Michael Warner’s conception
of  a  public  as  a  self-organized,  text-based  social space  created  by  the  reflexive  and
temporal  circulation of  discourse among strangers12.  Though Valley evinces a  host  of
genre norms in accord with the typological approaches highlighted above, for the sake of
brevity, I lump these into three rough groups: shifts in loyalty; the rhetoric of asking
questions, giving voice to others, and revealing truths; and, finally, the nature of the
“truth” revealed by conspiracy theory logic. 
7 Most obviously pertinent to the Can’t Not Say It debacle is the norm of radical shifts in
loyalty. At the plot level, Valley normalized stark turns in the behavior of key characters,
such  that  a  friend  one  week  might  be  an  enemy  the  next,  and  vice  versa.  The
transformation of a character known as Kara, who joined the third television series Valley
of the Wolves: Ambush during season six (2011-2012), provides one case in point. Kara, who
is loosely based on real-life MİT (Millî  İstihbarat Teşkilâtı  - National Intelligence Corps)
agent Mahmut Yıldırım (code name “Yeşil”),  is initially portrayed as a villain. Shortly
after being introduced to the plot (episode 129),  he assassinates Alper,  one of Polat’s
associates in the intelligence service (episode 131), and then Hamit, a man that Polat is
charged with  protecting  (episode  132).  Over  time,  however,  Polat  and Kara  come to
realize they have both been betrayed by the same forces, and they become closest allies.
Other key examples include the shifts in loyalty (and sympathetic portrayal of) Zaza Dayı
a sometimes nemesis, sometimes ally; key members of the Council of Elders (İhtiyarlar
Heyeti),  who are supposed to direct Polat in the interests of the state,  but sometimes
betray him; and even Abdülhey, one of Polat’s most trusted men, who shifts loyalties
while under the influence of mind control treatment.
8 One “lesson” from such twists in plot is that no one is to be trusted fully. Loyalties can
shift on a moment’s notice due to circumstances of national or supranational importance
that are far beyond the control of any single character. Indeed, though Valley reinforces
this  lesson textually  on a  regular  basis,  it  has  also  done so extra-textually  at  times.
Numerous long-time viewers of the show spoke to me about the changes in “message”
and “stance” that the show took with its various shifts between channels over the years
and, given the clientelist media model prominent in Turkey13, this is hardly surprising. At
a more personal level, the proclivity for radical shifts in loyalty was reinforced with the
high-profile feud that took place between Pana Film’s two key figures in 2013: producer
Raci Şaşmaz and his older brother, Necati Şaşmaz, who plays Polat Alemdar on the show.
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In the wake of the feud, which saw Raci leave the Pana team, long-time writers and key
actors also left, suggesting that bonds formed over years of working together could be as
fragile and liable to shift as those portrayed in the show. 
9 This  same  language  of  loyalty  shifts  is  deftly  employed  by  Doğan  and  Varol  in  the
following exchange on their first discussion of the “controversy” over Valley:
NIHAT DOĞAN. Some of our viewers are writing to say, look man, Valley of the Wolves is
the state’s show—it’s on the side of the state. 
ÖNÜR VAROL. Which state?
NIHAT DOĞAN. Statist? FETÖ was statist as well: the, in quotation marks, PİÇ, paralel
ihanet çetesi [parallel treachery gang], the parallel state structure, that is, the state
within  a  state14.  Were  not  Ramazan  Akyürek,  Ali  Fuat  Yılmazer,  soldiers,
prosecutors, judges, and those who bombed the people the state? They were the
state itself15.
10 To  provide  some  basic  context,  “FETÖ”  is  the  acronym  for  Fethullahçı  Terör  Örgütü
(Fethullaist Terror Network)—the AKP government’s name for the organization linked to
Islamic Scholar Fethullah Mthat presumed to be behind the coup attempt16. Doğan uses a
slang acronym, “PİÇ,” to refer to this group because the Turkish word “piç” is the insult,
“bastard.” Akyürek and Yılmazer are intelligence operatives working for the state who
are alleged to be members of the Fethullaist network, and to have had a role in the
assassination of Armenian journalist Hrant Dink in 2007. Doğan’s point is clear: there is
no way to tell who is on what side, so the Pana team could well be enemies of the state. 
11 Valley’s plot had made direct and clear reference to Gülen and his network as enemies of
the state, involved in attempts to “clone” the state structure from within, and to bring
down the  government,  since  2014.  Indeed  episode  218,  which  aired  early  that  year,
references and reenacts the three key aspects of what the AKP had already started calling
a “coup” in late 2013: the highly public opening of prosecution cases against a number of
key  AKP  party  members  for  corruption,  the  public  leaking  of  wiretap  tapes  to
demonstrate this corruption, and the “truck scandal,” in which Gülen loyalists in the
military prevented Turkish intelligence operatives from taking arms to Syria, allegedly to
support Turkmen opposition to the Asad regime. The series even created a character
based  on  Gülen  called  Muhterem  Bey.  Given  Valley’s  explicit  casting  of  the  Gülen
Movement as an enemy, completely in line with the AKP take on the so-called “parallel
state,” it is hard to understand how Varol and Doğan could implicate the franchise in the
coup, but the norm of shifting loyalty established by Valley may well have prepared the
way. Indeed,  the ability of the conspiracy argument to accommodate a shift  between
enemies is one of the hallmarks that Earl Creps has identified in the conspiracy theory
genre17. 
12 Doğan and Varol  do  not  directly  accuse  Valley of  participation in  the  coup attempt;
instead, they frame their task in terms of asking questions (and demanding an answer
from Pana Film),  providing a  platform for  others  to speak (especially  their  audience
members),  and  revealing  truths  (particularly  through  visual  evidence,  including
documents,  scenes  from  Valley,  and  on-the-scene  investigation  of  Valley filming
locations).  It  is  this  same  language  that  Valley and  its  creators  often  employ  when
defending their work. Speaking on the talk show Uncensored [Sansürsüz], airing on pro-
AKP channel 24 in 2012, Valley writer Bahadır Özdener explained to host Yiğit Bulut (now
a senior advisor to President Erdoğan) why Valley poses questions that no one else is
willing to ask by using a parable: 
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Yiğit Bey18, when we’re speaking about media there’s a basic rule. There’s a room
with five monkeys and there’s one banana hung in it. The first monkey tries to get
it and he’s sprayed with water. The second tries and he’s sprayed with water too.
After  that,  the  others  don’t  try,  and even if  others  are  added to  the  room the
previous monkeys prevent them from trying. Even when the old monkeys are all
switched out none of the monkeys (which weren’t victims of the water) is brave
enough to get the banana. Our young friends who enter the media are not told what
to  do,  They’re  told  what  topics  not  to  touch on.  This  isn’t  a  didactic  lesson,  it
happens little-by-little with courtesy. You can’t write a real history of our press
because it doesn’t have a real history. Unfortunately it’s beholden to the hegemony,
and the state never supported a good press. The worst facet of this is the youth
losing the ability to ask real questions19.
13 Both  Valley’s  producers  and  its  viewers  agree  that  the  show  asks  the  “necessary”
questions that others in Turkey are ignoring and, indeed, the rhetoric of “just asking
questions” is among the norms identified by Jovan Byford in the anatomy of conspiracy
theory20. 
14 Closely related to the issue of asking (and getting fans to ask) the tough questions, Valley’s
producers often explain their role as taking the side of the oppressed. Speaking on news
channel Habertürk during the promotional tour for the fourth Valley cinematic spinoff,
Valley  of  the  Wolves:  Palestine,  director  Zübeyr  Şaşmaz  and  his  older  brother  Necati
explained their goals from a photographic standpoint. Palestine finds Polat and his team
heading to Israel/Palestine after the Mavi Marmara flotilla raid in 2010 to kill the Israeli
commander responsible for the raid. Noting that the treatment of Palestinians depicted
in the film is based on facts from the Goldstone report, Zübeyr said that the Pana Film
team wanted to “take photographs” of reality and show them back to the people: 
ZÜBEYR. It’s like the difference between CNN and Al Jazeera: are you on the side that
drops  the  bomb,  or  the  side  where  it  lands?  A  war  photographer’s  situation  is
similar: you don’t want a war, but you can only do your job when there’s a war. It’s
the  same situation for  those  making this  kind of  film:  you’re  obliged to  take  a
picture and that’s what you do. 
NECATI. But, for the sake of security most people stay on the winning side. That’s
true  of  the  press  and  it  is  generally  true  of  filmmakers  as  well.  We’re  doing
something different. We’re one of the first large scale operations playing to a wide
audience to take the weaker side. We show where the bomb landed21. 
15 Necati expanded on this point in a later interview with journalist Can Dundar: “We are on
the side of the oppressed in all situations, regardless of their religion or race. […] Our
target audience is all people, to let them hear this sound, to tell this story. This is a good
action to take22.” While presenting a Palestinian side to the Israel/Palestine issue could
clearly be justified as taking the side of the oppressed, Necati’s claim that Valley does this
“in all situations” would appear to display, at best, deep political naiveté. The show’s
portrayal  of  the  Kurdish  rights  struggle,  for  instance,  is  far  from  sympathetic:  its
ultranationalistic take was so controversial that the second Valley TV series, Valley of the
Wolves: Terror, was removed from the air after just one episode. Similarly, despite Necati’s
denial of religious interest, Valley makes a clear point of demeaning Jewish and Christian
characters,  often casting them as the worst  sort  of  villains and,  in the case of  Jews,
portraying a host of common racist stereotypes as well. 
16 But while Necati’s statement could be read as a cynical marketing line, it could also be
taken as a literal description of the way the Pana team sees their project—that is, as part
of a greater struggle in which they are, a priori, defined as the weaker side. This notion is
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certainly  in  line  with  the  so-called  Sèvres  Syndrome  that  operates  among  many  in
Turkey,  and  also  animates  the  narrative  structure  of  the  show23.  The  name  of  this
“syndrome” refers to the infamous Treaty of Sèvres (1920), in which the remnants of the
Ottoman Empire were to be divided amongst European powers at the conclusion of the
First  World  War,  leaving  only  a  small  fraction of  the  land for  an  emergent  Turkey.
Turkey’s “independence struggle” was fought against Greece to prevent this outcome, but
the lasting cultural impact of this threat, reinforced through education and media, has
been an entrenched belief that only Turks will stand up for Turks, and that other nations
are constantly looking to divide and conquer the country. Such a belief would be in line
with what Richard Hofstadter has identified as the “paranoid style” that characterizes
conspiracy thinking.  In particular,  Hofstadter notes that  conspiracy theorists  tend to
conceive of their enemies as much stronger, “forces of almost transcendent power24”. 
17 Inherent  in  both  the  issue  of  posing  “real  questions”  and  “taking  the  side  of  the
oppressed” is the assumption that Valley’s project is somehow related to truth. Indeed,
the franchise’s reputation is based heavily on its presumed depiction of realities that
others dare not show. A number of viewers told me that Valley was an outlet for news
stories that cannot be printed, with one suggesting that sources would leak information
to Valley writers rather than reporters,  because the writers were more trusted (May,
2013). Another told me that “ninety percent of what you see on Valley is true” (October,
2014) and, while few viewers actually attempted to quantify the truth value of the show,
the sentiment, if not the number, was largely reflected by others.
18 Though Valley has often steered clear of overt claims—indeed, each episode of the TV
serial  begins  with  a  disclaimer  directly  rejecting  such  claims—they  have  at  times
capitalized on this reputation, as in the promotional trailer for the premier of Valley of the
Wolves Ambush season eight, released in the fall of 201325. It begins with a brief encounter
from the previous season between Polat and a character named Ronald. The latter is a
member of the Templars, a powerful secret society who are fighting to bring about a new
world order, and who constantly thwart Turkey’s progress: 
POLAT.  Turkey  is  moving  forward  to  become  a  world  power,  why  don’t  you
understand this?
RONALD. Your economic and military power is far too little for your goals.
19 This  is  followed  by  news  footage  of  conflicts  throughout  the  Middle  East,  including
General Sisi taking power in Egypt, soldiers marching on mountain trails, and skirmishes
between police and protestors during the Gezi Park Movement. Then the screen goes
blank, only to be replaced by penguins. A voiceover intones: “well, if you don’t want to
watch penguins, watch the facts on Valley of the Wolves.” 
20 The penguins are a reference to the blackout of news regarding the Gezi Park protests on
Turkish news channels during the summer of 2013—particularly to CNN Türk’s decision
to  broadcast  a  penguin  documentary  while  CNN  International  carried  news  of  the
protests live26. The intermingling of Valley text and news footage, alongside a reference to
the shortcomings of Turkish news reporting has a clear implication: Valley is the place to
come for the facts that you will not get elsewhere about what is happening, and about
Turkey’s role in the world. 
21 Though the “facts”  are  certainly  important,  my encounters  with viewers  lead me to
believe that it is the narrative weft among which these facts are interspersed with rumor
and  speculation  that  is  ultimately  the  most  salient  aspect  of  the  show,  providing  a
transcendent “truth” of sorts that offers order in a chaotic world. This order is the logic
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of conspiracy,  and it  is  the underlying premise and structure of the Valley franchise.
There is no shortage of examples. In the just-mentioned trailer, for instance, the framing
of crisis moments by a scene with the Templars suggests, in keeping with the narrative
line of the serial, that the Templars purposely quashed the Arab Spring, supported the
PKK, and instigated the Gezi Park protests in order to frustrate the “return” of Turkish
prominence to the world stage.
22 I have touched briefly above on some aspects of conspiracy genre that populate Valley and
the discourses surrounding it, referring, alternatively to the work of Creps, Byford, and
Hofstadter. Hofstadter was one of the first to tackle questions of conspiracy theory from
an academic standpoint, and among the key tenets of style he identifies are the notion of
a “vast and sinister conspiracy” operating via “subtle machinery27”, a pedantic concern
on the part of the theorist with exhaustive demonstration of his or her points28, and leaps
in imagination between supporting facts and conclusion29. Creps expands on Hofstadter’s
work, adding a number of other key tenets, including the above-mentioned flexibility of
the conspiracy argument to accommodate new enemies and/or subjects30.  Byford also
hearkens back to Hofstadter in his more recent typology of  the norms of conspiracy
theory, including among these that such theories reveal “a single, overarching plot which
supposedly explains  everything31” and acts  as  “a  motive force in  history32”;  that  the
conspirators work via a system of “hidden messages in political speeches, newspapers,
and on TV33”; and, crucially, the importance of foreknowledge about key events34. In each
of these cases,  the authors strive to characterize the norms of the conspiracy theory
genre. All three also mention the high prevalence of anti-Semitic stereotypes and casting
of Jews as chief conspirators in a global order.
23 Several of these genre norms are important in establishing the transcendent truth of
conspiracy logic that ties together Valley and its diverse subplots. The assumed role of
hidden messages, for instance, has been key to Valley’s logic from the outset. In the first
series,  Polat  routinely looked in the newspaper for clues that would be posted there
either as a message to him by, for example, Aslan Bey, his key contact in intelligence
services, or as a message to others that he could intercept in order to foil a plot. Years
later, the above-mentioned character Kara was introduced to Ambush in the same way,
hunting through newspapers for clues and clipping them out (S06, E129). Likewise, the
importance of foreknowledge about key political events is something many fans refer to
in explaining Valley’s value. Though it was often difficult for fans to point to specific
instances  when  I  pressed  for  examples,  multiple  informants  told  me  that  the  show
“predicted”  that  the  death  of  President  Turgut  Özal  in  1993  may  have  been  an
assassination. Valley began treating Özal’s death as an assassination with the first episode
of Ambush in 2007, and then proceeded to show the “details” of the crime in the film
Gladio, which came out in 2009. Though there had long been rumors of an assassination,
Valley was credited with “predicting” the “truth” when the government opened the death
up for investigation again in 201435. 
24 A number of the other hallmarks of conspiracy logic are displayed in the second episode
of season 9 (E231), one highlight of which is Andy Garcia reprising his 2005 role as a
character  called  Amon,  to  lecture  Polat  on  the  nature  of  the  “new  world  order36”.
Elsewhere in the episode, Polat sits in front of a chalkboard filled with key events from
2001-2014 and we hear a voiceover of his internal monolog as he ties together the World
Trade Center attacks of 2001, the US detention of Turkish soldiers in northern Iraq in
2003, the bombing of a consulate, synagogues, and a bank in Istanbul later that year, and
Genre strikes back: conspiracy theory, post-truth politics, and the Turkish c...
TV/Series, 13 | 2018
7
the formation of ŞEDİD, the Valley equivalent of the Islamic State. These events are shown
to  have  a  cohesive  internal  logic  tied  both  to  the  long-term  Valley plot  (e.g.  the
assassination of  key character  Mehmet Karahanlı  in  2003),  and to the greater  global
power structure. Editing suggests that England’s “Prince Henry” is part of a dynasty that
still runs the corporations that control various states, and that he is also the ultimate
power behind the Islamic State. 
25 Valley ultimately phased out the Henry character, displaying the flexibility in terms of
enemy norm noted above by Creps,  but  there was  no departure from the “vast  and
sinister conspiracy” united by a “single overarching plot” and acting as a “motive force in
history,” which are all key aspects of the conspiracy argument. Furthermore, we can see
very clearly the leaps in imagination from evidence to conclusion, which take place for
Polat at the chalkboard. 
26 Each of the genre traits identified above can also be seen in the Can’t Not Say It approach
to Valley. The initial “evidence” cited by the show for Pana Film’s suspicious behavior was
the  fact  that  the  company  had  purchased  the  rights  to  the  web  site
kurtlarvadisidarbe.com (valleyofthewolvescoup.com)  two months  prior  to  the  15  July
coup attempt. This was quickly bolstered with a claim that the appearance of the name
“Erdoğan” on a gravestone in the background of a cemetery scene from a 2012 episode
(S06, E159) should be read as a coded message about the downfall of the former Prime
Minister, now President of the country, Tayyip Erdoğan37. Indeed, the following day the
show sent a film crew to a cemetery to “expose” the fact that the gravestone in question
had been changed38.  Varol  claims that staff  at  the cemetery attest  to Valley’s  filming
there,  but  if  one  watches  the  talk  show  carefully,  stark  differences  between  the
cemeteries in question are clear: a worn-out sidewalk fronts the gravestone in the Can’t
Not Say It clip, while there is none in the Valley episode; the two scenes feature an entirely
different backdrop, with a forest in the Valley scene and more cemetery in the Can’t Not
Say It clip; even the gravestones in question are physically different, though Doğan and
Varol  explain this  as  the intentional  alteration by Valley;  finally,  there is  an obvious
difference in the gravestones behind the grave, suggesting in line with all of the above
that the show had found the wrong spot.
27 Pana Film released a statement the following day explaining that the web site had been
purchased in line with the broader concept of a “coup” by the Gülen Movement, noting as
well that the government had been using the term “coup” to refer to the Movement’s
actions since 2013. Furthermore, they noted that the Can’t Not Say It crew had, indeed,
gone to the wrong site, though cemetery staff had not been lying: Valley had filmed an
episode at the site investigated by the show—as many episodes feature cemeteries—it had
just been a different episode. They further explained that the gravestone in question
could still be found very easily in another cemetery and that it does say “Erdoğan.” 
28 These replies did little to dissuade the hosts of the talk show, who simply shifted their
attacks,  claiming  two days  later  that  Valley still  must  have  highlighted  the  Erdoğan
gravestone for a reason. They then moved to a different episode of Valley to reveal “clues”
about the show’s ulterior motives. Claiming that the ezan (Islamic call to prayer) was read
backwards  in  the trailer  to  season 10 (2015),  they had three religious  experts  on to
interpret the meaning of a reverse ezan, suggesting that it may have been both a sin and
an attempt at casting a spell on viewers. It is first worth noting that Can’t Not Say It does
not by any means establish that the ezan was actually read backwards. Nonetheless, Valley
’s clear tendency to highlight hidden messages within its plot line works against the show
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here,  as  host  Varol  notes  “we  highlight  these  sorts  of  details  because  this  is  an
‘operational’ serial that has been giving these kinds of hints regularly for 13 to 14 years39
.”  Indeed,  Valley had  even made a  plot  point  about  altered  ezan calls  being  used to
encourage conversion to Christianity in the spring of 2014 (season 8, episode 22140). 
29 Another such “detail” from the season 10 trailer allegedly relates to Israel. Polat discovers
a dead priest when he goes to a church in Cyprus and, as he leans down to examine the
body, an elongated pool of blood coming from the priest’s head is visible on screen. Doğan
and Varol claim that this blood puddle is in the shape of Israel, and Doğan goes on to
extrapolate that this must be a message about how the Gülen Movement is linked to
Israel, Zionism, the division of the Middle East, and the coming of a new world order. That
the  blood  puddle  in  question  only  resembles  Israel  insofar  as  both  are  somewhat
elongated may by now go without question, but we see here both the pedantic concern
for detail and the leaps of imagination highlighted by Hofstadter. 
 
Enunciating cracks in the story
30 If the brief survey above has demonstrated that Valley was plagued by the genre norms it
helped establish, it also hints at the weak nature of some of the claims related to the
show. Indeed, a mildly alert observer could see clearly that the visible evidence presented
in no way matched the claims it was meant to support. Though the conspiracy theory
phenomenon at work in Valley and its greater public is complex, and has many avenues
worthy of exploration, I focus here on this intriguing disconnect between claims and the
evidence that supports them. For Doğan and Varol were far from the only members of
Valley’s public to make outlandish claims. 
31 I met one member of this public, whom I will call Aşkın, at a social event in October of
2014.  This  was  a  tense  period  in  Turkey,  as  the  Kurdish People’s  Protection Units  (
Yekîneyên Parastina Gel - YPG) in Syria were fighting to defend the town of Kobane against
the Islamic State, and President Erdoğan had done all in his power to prevent those in
Turkey from assisting in the defense, either by sending goods or crossing the border to
provide  support.  His  rationale  was  that  the  YPG  was  affiliated  with  the  PKK  and,
therefore, that any assistance to their cause was assistance to terrorists. While Erdoğan
was far from alone in his take on the situation, many in Turkey felt that the Islamic State
was a greater threat than the YPG or even the PKK, and some Kurds and their allies also
felt inspired by the YPG and its project of a stateless autonomous rule in Rojava (Kurdish-
controlled Northern Syria). Aşkın was not among the latter group. 
32 I had been speaking to our mutual friend, whom I had known for years, about Kobane
when Aşkın intervened in the conversation. The friend introduced us and, when Aşkın
learned that I was an American studying, among other things Valley, he struck a tone that
I can only call deliberately combative while proceeding to lecture on what was “really”
going on in Kobane. Among his claims were that the PKK contained very few Kurds—that
the force was, rather, composed almost entirely of French, Germans, and Italians—and
that the Islamic State was a deliberate creation of the US and Israel. His account was
exhaustive, but I was not expecting to interview at that event, and neither did I ask his
permission  to  record,  so  many  of  the  details  are  now lost.  Ultimately,  however,  he
claimed that the “battle” for Kobane was no battle at all, but rather an elaborate charade
to steal oil and undermine Turkey’s integrity. “And so,” he concluded, “you see more than
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ninety percent of what they show on Valley of the Wolves is true.” I laughed at this, but he
repeated the claim, adding, “I’m serious, it may sound a bit crazy but the show really gets
it right41.”
33 One thing that I found striking about this encounter was Aşkın’s mode of engagement.
Each statement seemed to me to be delivered as an angry but nervous challenge against
what I can only assume Aşkın perceived as my default “American” point of view on the
world. He leaned towards me, adopting a stern, lecturing tone of voice that gave no pause
for  dialog,  and  used  his  finger  to  point  at  me  when  referencing  the  US.  His  gaze
alternated  between  a  smoldering  stare  and  what  I  perceived  to  be  a  search  for
confirmation—as if he wanted to gauge the effect of this performance on me.
34 This  interaction  took  place  just  weeks  after  the  broadcast  of  episode  231,  which  I
highlight above in terms of conspiracy logic and truth. Valley’s presentation of the Islamic
State (or, as the show calls it, ŞEDİD) might be interpreted as in line with what Aşkın says,
as there is little doubt either in the show or the real world that US interests in the region
have much to do with oil. (In Valley, the immediate force behind ŞEDİD seems to be a
company in the UK tied to the British Royal Family, but it is not entirely clear how this
links to more distant forces, and the US and Israel often feature as part of the ultimate
enemy in Valley plots.) But while Valley presents a complicated picture of the PKK and its
motives, the show’s portrayal does not mesh with Aşkın’s account of a force composed
mainly of Europeans. That is, it is hard to see why Aşkın would share this theory about
the PKK, which goes directly against well-publicized facts about the organization and
against Valley’s representation of the organization, while claiming the show was mostly
true. Placing Aşkın’s insistence on the “ninety percent” truth of the show next to his
performative engagement, however, I think his aim may have been provocation rather
than a claim to referential accuracy. 
35 In  a  discussion  of  so-called  “White  nihilism”  among  “hooligans”  participating  in  a
controversial annual pigeon shoot in the US, ethnographer Hoon Song notes that the
hooligans  he  met  were  also  conspiracy  theorists  who  embraced  absolutist  theories
despite clear deficiencies in their claims. Part of the reason for this, he suggests, is to
provoke:
Conspiracy theorists are not essentialists despite themselves; they actively choose
to be so. They are militantly disinterested in the ideas of “partial truths”, of the
contingency of meaning, of the Foucauldian wisdom that their version might be
merely one of many “regimes of truth”. Instead, stigmatization only breeds claims
to even Bigger Truths. […] Much more than a referential claim, their “theory” is an
apparatus that provokes42.
36 For Song,  a  key element of  the conspiracy theory is  that inevitable moment when a
propositional  claim loses  referential  validity.  When  the  evidence  cannot  sustain  the
claim. Something “escapes capture” at this moment, and this escape is best characterized
by the Foucauldian concept of enunciation, which “refers to the event of discourse, not to
its ‘content’; to its taking place, not to the text of what is stated43”. 
37 Many thinkers  on conspiracy  theory  working  in  what  I  have  called  the  interpretive
tradition highlight the apparent rise and spread of such theorizing as a reaction to the so-
called postmodern condition:  the conspiracy theory provides an overarching logic  to
account for the loss of master narratives and give the self a sense of place in an otherwise
fragmentary  world.  But  Song’s  observation  on  enunciation  in  the  circulation  of
conspiracy  suggests  something  important  about  this  would-be  master  narrative:
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conspiracy theory may not be so much a replacement as it is a new sort of narrative, one
in which the cracks in the story are clear, and are alternately invitation or provocation. 
 
Post-truth politics, factishes, and the stakes of
conspiracy
38 In  contemporary  Turkey,  these  cracks  may  serve  as  invitation,  for  example, to  the
roughly  half  of  the  population  who  accepts  Erdoğan’s  repeated  assertions  that  any
difficulties in the economy stem from the manipulation of a “finance lobby” bent on
quashing Turkey’s rise to prominence. There is no evidence for such a lobby and, indeed,
much to the contrary to suggest that it is Erdoğan’s political and economic policies that
have damaged the economy. Nonetheless, both Erdoğan and Valley attest to such a lobby,
inviting and provoking others to speak of it, as if repetition will conjure its existence44. 
39 And, in an era that is increasingly referred to as that of “post-truth” politics, this may be
true, in a sense. Bruno Latour has introduced the notion of a “factish”—a curious hybrid
between fact and fetish that hearkens back to the time before humans purported to be
modern, when belief was not opposed to fact45. For Latour, who holds that we never really
could  be  modern—that  we  could  never  shake  the  importance  of  belief  and  merely
transferred that belief from religion to fields such as science, ignoring that they were just
as constructed in many ways—the factish represents a possibility to heal the modern
break between what is “real” and what is constructed:
The  solution  of  the  factish  is  not  to  ignore  the  choice  [between  reality  and
construction],  as  so  many  postmoderns  will  do  by  saying:  “Yes,  of  course,
construction and reality are the same thing; we know that everything is illusion
and make-believe.” The factish says something else: It is because it is constructed
that is it so exactly real, so autonomous, so independent of our own hands. As long
as  we  do  not  understand the  synonymy between construction  and autonomous
reality, we misconstrue the factishes as another sort of social constructivism and
not as what modified the theory of what it is to construct anything46.
40 I am suggesting that we consider Latour’s factish as the acknowledged construction at the
heart of many a conspiracy theory. The enunciative (and, often, performative) gesture
that aims beyond the content of discourse to something else is the factish. Taking the
factish seriously means countenancing a politics beyond the binary of fact and fiction. If
conspiracy theory plays a role in the surge of so-called post-truth politics in Turkey and
beyond, the “remedy” for such politics cannot simply be a turn to facts. 
41 Assuming that facts will demystify the conspiracy theory is to assume that facts are the
desired  object  of  the  theorist,  but  this  is  almost  certainly  a  projection  steeped  in
misunderstanding.  As  Latour  suggests  at  the  end  of  a  laundry  list  of  revolutions  in
western philosophical thought: “Each time the misinterpretation is the same: the naive
belief  in  the  other’s  naive  belief47.”  Turkish  media  and  media  criticism  are  rife  with
discussion of the “ignorant” (cahil) audience and its manipulation by shows like Valley.
Indeed the Valley enthusiasts and the Valley detractors noted above are likely to be seen
as “ignorant” by many of the educated elite in Turkey. But the factish suggests that these
publics may be up to something else: that the conspiracy logic so key to both the show
and some political movements is not about proof but invitation. That insistence on facts
precludes not only belonging but also understanding.
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42 This is a cautionary tale. As Latour notes, “the reason one should always beware with
factishes is that the consequences are unseen, the moral order fragile, the social order
unstable48.”  The Pana Film team felt  the unwelcome return of conspiracy logic in an
investigation that hints at such consequences.  In February of 2017 that investigation,
which was likely inspired by the Can’t Not Say It accusations, and sought to determine
whether the production firm had anything to do with the coup, was dismissed by the
Terror and Organized Crime Investigation Bureau of the Republic Chief Prosecutor of
Istanbul49. While this suggests that factishes may lose potency in court, their overtures
are quite powerful in other fields, and their progress from Valley to beyond certainly
warrants attention. Indeed, the “coup” that inspired Valley’s web site purchase might well
be called a factish morphed to fact: an object of AKP fantasy and fascination that led to
such antagonism of the Gülen Movement that it  almost had to act.  Turkey’s political
history is rich with real conspiracies that certainly began as theories of a sort, and richer
still with theories about conspiracies yet to be revealed. The factish demands that we
treat the latter with due care, developing an approach beyond the simple fact/fiction
binary if we aim for political progress. 
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NOTES
1. The TV serial Valley of the Wolves [Kurtlar Vadisi] premiered on Turkish private channel Show
TV in January of 2003, and shifted to private channel Kanal D for its fourth and final season in the
fall of 2005. It was followed by the blockbuster film Valley of the Wolves: Iraq [Kurtlar Vadisi: Irak,
2006] and then the short-lived serial Valley of the Wolves: Terror [Kurtlar Vadisi: Terör] in 2007. Next
was  serial  Valley  of  the  Wolves:  Ambush  [Kurtlar  Vadisi:  Pusu],  which  ran  for  10  seasons,  from
2007-2016,  shifting  among private  channels  Show TV,  Star  TV,  TNT,  ATV,  and Kanal  D.  The
franchise has thus far led to four more films: comedy spinoff Muro: Damn the Humanist Inside [
Muro: Nalet Olsun İçimdeki İnsan Sevgisine,  2008], and dramas Valley of the Wolves:  Gladio [Kurtlar
Vadisi: Gladio, 2009], Valley of the Wolves: Palestine [Kurtlar Vadisi: Filistine, 2011], and Valley of the
Wolves: Homeland [Kurtlar Vadisi:  Vatan,  2017]. The latter film tackles the topic of the July 2016
coup attempt, though producers clearly decided against using the “coup” name that had aroused
such controversy.  As of March 2018,  there are rumors that serial  Valley of  the Wolves:  Chaos [
Kurtlar Vadisi: Kaos] will start production in the summer of 2018 for a fall premier on an as-yet
undesignated  channel.  Various  elements  of  the  Valley franchise  have  circulated  outside  of
Turkey, with films and serials making their way to Germany, parts of the Balkans, the Turkic
republics, and much of the Arab world.
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2. I spent four years in Istanbul between 2011 and 2015 working on various projects related to
Turkish media, including one focused on Valley and its viewers.
3. Jean Comaroff  and John Comaroff,  “Transparent Fictions;  or,  the Conspiracies  of  a  Liberal
Imagination: an Afterword”, in Transparency and Conspiracy: Ethnographies of Suspicion in the New
World Order, ed. Todd Sanders and Harry G. West, Durham, North Carolina, Duke University Press,
2003, p. 287-299. 
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Minneapolis, Minnesota, University of Minnesota Press, 2008.
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University of Chicago Press, 1999.
These trends are by no means mutually exclusive, and thinkers such as Fenster and Byford
engage in aspects of all three.
5. Richard  Hofstadter,  The  Paranoid  Style  in  American  Politics  and  Other  Essays,  Cambridge,
Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1952.
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13. Christian  Christensen,  “Concentration  of  Ownership,  the Fall  of  Unions  and Government
Legislation in Turkey”, Global Media and Communication, Vol. 3, No. 2, 2007, p. 179-199.
14. I provide a portion of the Turkish original here because the specific acronym is important to
the message.
15. Önür Varol, and Nihat Doğan, Sölyemezsem Olmaz [Can't not say it], Beyaz TV, 2016, 6 October.
16. There is little doubt among observers of Turkey that core elements of this organization were
instrumental in the coup. Given the group’s highly ambiguous structure and the broad nature of
its outreach, however, it is inconceivable that the majority of those associated with the group
through  its  various  service,  educational,  media,  commercial,  and  financial  ventures  were
involved. This has not prevented the Turkish government from persecuting these associates and
any other perceived opponents of the AKP during the post-coup State of Emergency. For more
about the Gülen Movement and its ambiguous organizational logic, see Joshua D Hendrick, Gülen:
the Ambiguous Politics of Market Islam in Turkey and the World, New York, New York University Press,
2013. For an overview of the Gülen Movement’s relationship with the Turkish bureaucracy, the
AKP, and some early hypotheses on the nature of the coup, see Dexter Filkins, “Turkey's Thirty-
Year Coup”, The New Yorker, 2016, 17 October.
17. Creps, p. 97.
18. “Bey” is a term of respect, somewhat close to the English “Mr.”, but used with the first name
rather than the last.
19. Yiğit Bulut, Bahadır Özdener, and Cüneyt Aysan, Sansürsüz [Uncensored], 24, 2012, 30 October. 
20. Byford, p. 90.
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21. This is a rough translation, excising repetition and condensing the original.
Bedia Güzelce, Necati Şaşmaz, Nur Aysan, Zübeyr Şaşmaz, and Kenan Çoban, Skala: 'Kurtlar Vadisi
Filistin' ekibi Skala'da [The Valley of the Wolves team on Skala], Habertürk, 2011, 24 January.
22. Can Dündar and Necati Şaşmaz, Polat Alemdar NTV'de [Polat Alemdar on NTV], NTVMSNBC, 2011,
27 January 2011.
23. Though there are many cases of this throughout Valley, episode 115 provides a prominent
example, when Polat warns the head of elders that Turkey faces an “even worse condition than
Sèvres” if circumstances in the country don’t change. Both Dietrich Jung (“The Sevres Syndrome:
Turkish  Foreign  Policy  and  its  Historical  Legacy”,  American  Diplomacy, Vol.  8,  2003)  and
Michelangelo Guida (”The Sevres Syndrome and "Komplo" Theories in the Islamist and Secular
Press”, Turkish Studies, Vol. 9, No. 1, 2008, p. 37-52) have written about the so-called “syndrome”
and its circulation in contemporary Turkey.
24. Hofstadter, p. 29.
25. The disclaimer reads, “The people and institutions in our program’s account of events from
this  dark,  clouded  Turkish  valley  are  entirely  a  work  of  fiction.”  As  of  March  2018,  the
promotional trailer for Ambush season 8 was available at this link: https://tinyurl.com/hg535qf.
The video says 11th season at the end because this was the 11th year of the franchise, but only
the 8th season of the third TV serial, Ambush. Pana Film uses both sets of numbers to refer to the
show at different times.
26. For more on Penguins and their role in the Gezi Park protests, see Josh Carney and Valentina
Marcella, “Screens of Satire and Commons of Resistance: the Place and Role of Humor in the Gezi
Park Protests of Turkey”, Ridiculosa, Vol. 24, 2017, p. 151-164.
27. Hofstadter, p. 29.
28. Hofstadter, p. 35.
29. Hofstadter, p. 37.
30. Creps, p. 97.
31. Byford, p. 33.
32. Byford, p. 34.
33. Byford, p. 81.
34. Byford, p. 86.
35. HDN Staff, “Report Casts Doubt on Ex-President's Death”, Hürriyet Daily News, 2014, 14 June.
36. I have assembled a brief, subtitled compilation of conspiracy-oriented clips from this episode
and posted it at the following link: https://youtu.be/p3RDr7gD6lo.
37. Önür Varol, and Nihat Doğan, Sölyemezsem Olmaz [Can't not say it], Beyaz TV, 2016, 10 October.
38. Önür Varol, and Nihat Doğan, Sölyemezsem Olmaz [Can't not say it], Beyaz TV, 2016, 11 October.
39. Önür Varol, and Nihat Doğan, Sölyemezsem Olmaz [Can't not say it], Beyaz TV, 2016, 14 October.
40. One of the underlying motives for this theme was likely the YouTube ban in Turkey that took
place at the time of the municipal elections on March 31st. The government had banned YouTube
in an attempt to prevent further leaks revealing AKP corruption from the Gülen Movement.
Valley E220 and E221, which broadcast at this period, suggest that mind control techniques were
being used on the Turkish people through subliminal messages in social media and, therefore,
that something drastic needed to be done to prevent this danger.
41. I recorded these lines and a brief sketch of our interaction on paper moments later, and then
added this to my fieldnotes when I returned home that night.
42. Hoon Song,  “Seeing Oneself  Seeing Oneself:  White Nihilism in Ethnography and Theory”,
Ethnos: Journal of Anthropology, Vol. 71, No. 4, 2006, p. 482 [p. 470 – 488]. 
43. Song, p. 482, italics in original.
44. Ambush specifically tackles the “lobby” in episode 212 (S08), where it is shown to be tied to
both the Templars and the Gülen Movement.
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45. Bruno Latour, “A Few Steps Toward an Anthropology of the Iconoclastic Gesture”, Science in
Context, Vol. 10, No. 1, 1997, p. 63-83. 
46. Latour, p. 69.
47. Latour, p. 81.
48. Latour, p. 80.
49. Yazete Staff, “Saçmalık Son Buldu... Kurtlar Vadisi Darbe için Takipsizlik Kararı Verildi! [Absurdity
Comes to an End [...] Dismissal Decision for Valley of the Wolves Coup],” Yazete, 2017, 7 February. Weeks
later, it was revealed that an indictment for defamation against the Can’t Not Say It presenters had
been filed based on complaints by Pana Film: Yazete Staff,  “‘Kurtlar  Vadisi  Darbe’ye  Hakaretten
Nihat Dog ̆an, O ̈mür Varol ve Ekibine Hapis Istemi” [Prison Motion Against Nihat Dog ̆an, O ̈mür Varol and
Team for Defamation of ‘Valley of the Wolves’], Yazete, 2017, 27 February.
ABSTRACTS
Shortly  after  the July  2016 coup attempt in  Turkey,  two talk  show hosts  suggested that  the
producers  of  the popular  and long-lived Valley  of  the  Wolves  media  franchise  may have been
involved with the coup. While these accusations received only minor traction in Turkish media,
they are interesting both because they likely played a role in the franchise being investigated,
and because they relied on a set of genre norms for conspiracy theory that had been popularized
and codified in Turkey’s public sphere by the Valley franchise itself. This paper investigates the
relationship between conspiracy theory, Valley, and the show’s public in a three-part argument.
It begins by exploring the genre norms of conspiracy theory as they relate to Valley. Next, it turns
to the performative function of conspiracy theory, suggesting that the Foucauldian approach to
enunciation may explain an under examined role of such theorizing. Finally, it remarks on the
ties between conspiracy theory, enunciation, and politics in the rise of what is often called the
post-truth era. 
Peu de temps après la tentative de coup d’État de juillet 2016 en Turquie, deux invités de talk-
show  ont  émis  l’idée  que  les  producteurs  de  La  Vallée  des  Loups,  une  franchise  médiatique
populaire en Turquie, auraient pu être impliqués dans le coup d’État. Si ces accusations n’ont
connu qu’une faible couverture médiatique dans les médias turcs, elles sont intéressantes, parce
qu’elles ont certainement joué un rôle dans l’ouverture d’une enquête sur cette franchise,  et
parce qu’elles reposaient sur un certain nombre de normes de genre de la théorie du complot, qui
avaient  été  popularisées  et  codifiées  par la  série  La Vallée  des  loups elle-même.  Cet  article  se
penche sur la relation entre la théorie du complot, La Vallée des loups, et le public de la série, en
trois parties. Il commence par explorer les normes de genre de la théorie du complot, dans leur
rapport à La Vallée des loups. Ensuite, il se tourne vers la fonction performative de la théorie du
complot, en faisant l’hypothèse que l’approche foucaldienne de l’énonciation pourrait expliquer
un rôle sous-étudié de ces théories. L’auteur conclut par une série de remarques sur les liens
entre théorie du complot, énonciation et politique, dans le contexte de la montée en puissance de
l’ère de la « post-vérité ». 
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